In this study, we argue that share price reaction to a ®rm's capital expenditure decisions depends critically on the market's assessment of the quality of its investment opportunities. We postulate that announcements of increases (decreases) in capital expenditures positively (negatively) aect the stock prices of ®rms with valuable investment opportunities. Contrarily, we predict that announcements of increases (decreases) in capital spending negatively (positively) aect the share prices of ®rms without such opportunities. Our empirical results are generally consistent with these predictions. Overall, empirical evidence supports our conjecture that it is the quality of the ®rm's investment opportunities rather than its industry aliation which determines the share price reaction to its capital expenditure decisions. Ó 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Corporate managers are regularly faced with three major policy decisions ± capital expenditure decisions, dividend (payout) decisions, and ®nancing decisions. Recently, a number of studies have rigorously examined the impact of announcements of corporate ®nancing and dividend decisions on the market value of ®rms (see, for example, Masulis, 1980 Masulis, , 1983 Eades et al., 1985; Kalay and Lowenstein, 1985; Ofer and Siegel, 1987; Barclay and Litzenberger, 1988; Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; Loderer and Mauer, 1992; Denis, 1994; Jung et al., 1996) . However, empirical evidence on the valuation eects of announcements of corporate capital expenditure decisions is relatively sparse. In this study, we provide additional evidence on the impact of capital expenditure decisions on share prices. McConnell and Muscarella (1985) examine the market reaction to capital expenditure decisions by industrial and public utility ®rms. They ®nd that announcements of increases (decreases) in capital expenditures lead to signi®cant positive (negative) stock returns for industrial ®rms. For public utility ®rms, however, they ®nd that announcements of capital expenditure decisions do not have any material eect on stock returns. Chan et al. (1990) examine the market response to announcements of R&D spending by ®rms in both highand low-technology industries. They ®nd that those ®rms in high-technology industries which announce increases in R&D spending, on average, experience positive abnormal returns, but those in low-technology industries experience negative returns. Chan et al. (1994) ®nd that the stock market reacts positively to business relocation decisions that are motivated by business expansion or cost savings, but negatively to decisions that are motivated by capacity reduction or facilities consolidation.
Although previous studies make important contributions to furthering our understanding of the valuation eects of corporate investment decisions, they do not fully explain why resource allocation decisions of some companies are favorably received by the market, whereas similar decisions of other companies are negatively received by the market. While previous studies suggest that the market tends to react more favorably to the capital spending decisions of high-technology or industrial ®rms, their categorization of ®rms is ad hoc at best and lacks sound economic reasoning.
In this study, we argue that share price reaction to a ®rm's capital expenditure decisions depends critically on the market's assessment about the quality of the ®rm's investment opportunities. We postulate that announcements of increases (decreases) in capital spending will positively (negatively) aect the share prices of ®rms with valuable investment opportunities. For ®rms without such opportunities, however, we predict that announcements of increases (decreases) in capital spending negatively (positively) in¯uence share prices. Although ®rms in high-technology industries may, on average, have better investment opportunities than ®rms in low-technology industries, it is quite possible that poorly managed ®rms in high-technology industries would have lower growth potential than well-managed ®rms in low-technology industries. The basic premise of our study is that it is a ®rm's growth prospects rather than its industry aliation which determine the market's reaction to capital expenditure decisions. 1 We use Tobin's q ratio as an instrumental variable to classify our sample of ®rms into those with valuable investment opportunities and those without such opportunities. We ®nd evidence that is generally consistent with our conjectures. We ®nd that announcements of increases in capital spending result in positive share price changes among ®rms with Tobin's q ratios of greater than unity. We also ®nd that the market reacts favorably to the announcements of reduced capital expenditures when those announcements are made by low-q companies. Empirical results also show that announcements of increases in capital expenditures made by low-q companies in high-technology industries exert a negative impact on share price. Similarly, the market reacts negatively to announcements of decreases in capital spending made by high-q companies in low-technology industries. These results are consistent with our conjecture that the ®rm's growth prospects rather than its industry aliation determine the market's reaction to capital expenditure decisions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our hypotheses. Sample selection procedure and descriptive statistics are detailed in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss the methodology and present the empirical results. The paper ends with a brief summary.
Tobin's q and the market reaction to capital expenditure decisions
Lately numerous studies utilize Tobin's q as an empirical proxy for a ®rm's investment opportunity set. employ Tobin's q ratio as an empirical proxy for the quality of a ®rm's current and anticipated projects. They ®nd that takeovers of poorly managed targets (i.e. ®rms with q ratio of less than unity) by well-managed bidders (i.e. ®rms with q ratio of greater than unity) have higher bidder, target, and total gains. In a similar vein, Lang et al. (1991) use Tobin's q to distinguish ®rms which have valuable investment opportunities from those which do not, and ®nd evidence that bidder returns are negatively related to cash¯ows for low-q bidders but not for high-q bidders. In addition, Lang and Litzenberger (1989) Pilotte (1992) , Denis (1994) and Jung et al. (1996) use Tobin's q ratio as an empirical proxy for the ®rm's investment opportunities.
Following these studies, we view ®rms with q's in excess of unity as those with valuable investment opportunities. Since these ®rms are expected to have positive net present value projects, announcements by such ®rms of increases in capital expenditures are expected to be favorably received by the market. On the other hand, announcements of capital expenditure reduction by such ®rms may be viewed as non-value maximizing decisions by the market. These considerations lead to our ®rst hypothesis: Hypothesis 1. For ®rms with Tobin's q ratios of greater than unity, announcements of increases (decreases) in capital expenditures have a positive (negative) eect on share price.
Conversely, ®rms with q's of less than unity may lack valuable investment opportunities. Because these ®rms' future projects are not expected to be lucrative, announcements of capital expenditure increases by such ®rms may be unfavorably viewed by the market. Indeed, investors may prefer that these ®rms reduce capital expenditures. These considerations lead to our next proposition:
Hypothesis 2. For ®rms with Tobin's q ratios of less than unity, announcements of increases (decreases) in capital expenditures have a negative (positive) eect on share price.
In the following sections, we employ both the standard event-study methodology and regression analysis to empirically test these hypotheses.
Sample selection procedure and data description
Data on capital expenditure announcements are collected from Nexis/Lexis services over the 15 year period 1981±1995. For each capital expenditure decision, an announcement date is identi®ed as the earlier of the date the capital spending decision is announced in the Wall Street Journal or the date the announcement ®rst appears in other major newspapers/newswires covered by Nexis/Lexis services. The search is conducted using key words such as``capital expenditures'',``capital outlays'',``capital spending'',``long term expenditures,'' and``planned expenditures''. These key words initially identify 425 capital expenditure announcements. However, only the announcements meeting the following criteria are maintained in the sample:
1. Announcements must be directly pertinent to capital spending decisions. We include in the sample only the announcements of changes (at either corporate or divisional level) in capital expenditures.
2 Thus, announcements of corporate acquisitions, tender oers, or short-term strategic alliances are all excluded from the sample.
2. Announcements must contain de®nite plans rather than conjectures about the future. Moreover, announcements must include information about the approximate size and the general use of the funds.
3. Announcements must be made in isolation of other announcements (i.e. announcements on sales, earnings, dividend, equity or debt oerings, or top management changes) which occur within three days on either side of the announcements. This procedure minimizes the eect of extraneous information on stock prices.
4. Announcements must be made by companies whose complete daily return data during the study period are available from the NYSE/AMEX or NAS-DAQ ®les on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tape.
These restrictions eliminate 67 announcements from the initial sample. In addition, 50 announcements are made by companies that are not included in the Compustat ®les. Hence our ®nal dataset comprises 308 capital expenditure announcements.
We calculate Tobin's q ratio for each company using the method in Lindenberg and Ross (1981). Tobin's q is measured as of the year ending just prior to the capital expenditure announcement. Using data in the Compustat industrial ®les, GNP de¯ator, and bond yields, we ®rst calculate the market value of ®rms and the replacement cost of assets (see Appendix A for a detailed explanation of the procedure). Tobin's q is then obtained by dividing the market value by the replacement cost. Table 1 presents the frequency of capital expenditure announcements made by the group of high-q companies (i.e. q P 1) and by the group of low-q companies (i.e. q`1) during each year of the study period. For the entire study period, our sample of high-q companies made 73 announcements of capital expenditure increases and 33 announcements of capital expenditure decreases. For low-q companies, there were 131 announcements of capital expenditure increases and 71 announcements of capital expenditure decreases. Hence our data show that announcements of``increases'' in capital expenditures are more 2 For companies with many divisions or subsidiaries, it is possible that the q ratio of a division of the ®rm would be dierent from the ®rm's overall q ratio, which is the average of divisional q ratios. A meaningful analysis of stock market reactions to divisional capital expenditure announcements would require information on divisional q ratios. Because we use Tobin's q ratio of the ®rm for the purpose of classifying it into high-or low-q group, rather than the divisional q ratio, our results are subject to measurement error associated with q ratio. To assess the sensitivity of our results to the measurement error, we also perform empirical analyses after all divisional capital spending announcements are dropped from the sample. The results, however, are qualitatively similar to those presented subsequently. Hence, for brevity, we report the results based on the whole sample.
common among both group of companies. Our data also indicate that high-q companies make fewer announcements of their capital spending decisions than do low-q companies.
3 This is perhaps because capital spending decisions of high-q ®rms usually have signi®cant strategic value, and therefore they may not publicize their decisions to the extent possible. 4 If indeed high-q ®rms tend to announce only those capital spending decisions that would have minor rami®cation for their competitive advantage, while concealing their investments with signi®cant strategic value, our study will be subject to a sample selection bias. The bias will, however, work against the predicted stock price changes stipulated in our Hypotheses 1 and 2. Table 2 presents the size of capital expenditure changes as measured by the percentage change from the previous year. Panel A presents the summary statistics for high-q ®rms and panel B for low-q ®rms. In each panel, the mean, median, minimum, maximum, and select percentile values of capital expenditure changes (in percent) are reported for the group of high-technology as well as for the group of low-technology ®rms. For our sample of high-q ®rms, the mean value of increases in capital budget is 28.81%, while the mean value of decreases in capital budget is A26%. For low-q ®rms, the corresponding ®gures are 36.66% and A34.77%, respectively. Overall, these results indicate that our sample of ®rms made signi®cant year-to-year changes in their capital budget. The results also suggest that low-q companies tend to make larger year-to-year capital spending changes than high-q companies.
Methodology and ®ndings

Measuring abnormal returns
We use the standard event study methodology to measure abnormal stock price movements around capital expenditure announcements. The estimation period is from A150 to A31 days prior to announcement. The event period is de®ned as 30 days before through 10 days after announcement. Daily stock return data during the study period (A150 days before through 10 days after announcement) are obtained from the CRSP ®les. Let R it designate the stock return of ®rm i on day t. Then the abnormal return of ®rm i (AR it ) during the event period is measured using the following formula:
where R mt is the CRSP value-weighted market return on day t, and a i and b i are Scholes±Williams estimates of market model parameters during the estimation period. Next, the standardized abnormal return of ®rm i on day t (SR it ) during the event period is calculated using the following formula:
where r it r i 1 1
In Eq. (3), R m is the average market return during the estimation period and r i is the standard deviation of ®rm i's market model residuals.
6
The average standardized abnormal return on day t (SAR t ) is then obtained by averaging the standardized abnormal return over all i, i.e. SAR t i SR it / N, where N is the number of announcements. The cumulative standardized abnormal return (CSAR s ) is measured by the intertemporal summation of the average standardized abnormal returns over a given period, i.e., CSAR s s SAR t /(s A t + 1) 1a2 , where s denotes the summation over t t through s, t and s are the beginning and ending day of each CSAR calculation respectively.
We then use the following statistics to test whether SAR t diers from zero
5 Scholes±Williams estimates of market model parameters are calculated using the formulae:
, and b i are, respectively, the values of Cov(R it , R mtÀ1 )/r(R mt )r(R mtÀ1 ), Cov(R it , R mt )/ r(R mt )r(R mt ), and Cov(R it , R mt1 )/r(R mt )r(R mt1 ) during the estimation period t A150 to A31. q m is the ®rst-order autocorrelation coecient of the value-weighted market return during the estimation period (see Scholes and Williams, 1977, p. 317) .
6 See Warner et al. (1988) for the description of this methodology.
and to test whether CSAR s diers from zero
When corporate announcements increase the variance of returns, the above test tends to unfairly reject the null hypothesis (see Brown and Warner, 1985; Kalay and Lowenstein, 1985; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990) . To check the sensitivity of our results with respect to event-induced variance changes, we also employ the event study method developed by Boehmer et al. (1991) . Boehmer et al. suggest the following statistics to test whether SAR t and CSAR s are different from zero:
Here, CSR is is the cumulative standardized abnormal return for stock i, T t and T s are t-distributed random variables, and all other variables are the same as previously de®ned.
Announcement day returns for high-and low-q companies
A basic question this study seeks to answer is whether changes in capital expenditures have systematically dierent eects on the prices of high-and low-q ®rms. Hence we calculate abnormal returns associated with announcements of capital expenditure decisions for the group of high-q ®rms as well as for the group of low-q ®rms. Table 3 reports both the average abnormal returns (AAR t i AR it /N) and the average standardized abnormal returns (SAR t i SR it /N) for days A5 through +5. For days A30 through A6 and days 6 through 10, we report, for brevity, the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR s ) and the cumulative standardized abnormal returns (CSAR s ) during respective subperiods. 7 The results show that the market on average reacts favorably to the announcements by high-q ®rms of increases in capital expenditures. Both Z and T statistics indicate that excess returns on the announcement day are positive and signi®cant. Moreover, the number of positive standardized abnormal returns (SR) is signi®cantly greater than the number of negative SR on the an-7 CAAR s is measured by the intertemporal summation of the average abnormal returns over a given period, i.e., CAAR s s AAR t , where s denotes the summation over t t through s, t and s are, the beginning and ending day of each CAAR calculation, respectively. nouncement day, suggesting that the results are not due to a few large outliers. An inspection of the distribution of the announcement day abnormal returns, shown in Fig. 1 , further con®rms the above ®nding.
The results, however, show that the share price change associated with announcements by low-q companies of increases in capital expenditures is quite dierent from the one associated with the same announcement by high-q companies. Panel B of Table 3 shows that these companies experience signi®cant share price decreases around such announcements. Both T and Z statistics indicate that abnormal returns on day A3, 0, and 5 are signi®cantly negative for these companies. These results are consistent with our conjecture that the market reaction to ®rms' capital spending decisions will be unfavorable when their investment opportunities are perceived to be non-lucrative.
The abnormal returns associated with corporate announcements of decreases in capital expenditures are also systematically dierent between high-and low-q companies. Our results show that such announcements made by low-q companies are received favorably by the market, while the same announcements are unfavorably received when made by companies with valuable investment opportunities.
Overall, these results support our conjecture that a critical variable in¯uenc-ing the market's reaction to a ®rm's capital spending decision is the market's perception of the quality of its investment opportunities. For ®rms with valuable investment opportunities, the market reacts favorably to increases in their capital budgets, but negatively to decreases in capital budgets. On the contrary, the market reacts negatively to increases in their capital budgets, but positively to decreases in capital budgets for ®rms with poor investment opportunities.
To examine the sensitivity of our results, abnormal share price changes are also measured using mean-adjusted returns (see Brown and Warner, 1980) . In this case, excess returns are measured by subtracting the mean return during the estimation period from daily stock returns during the event period. The results are qualitatively identical to those presented here. 8 Hence we conclude that our results are quite robust and not sensitive to how the abnormal returns are measured.
Industry in¯uence on announcement day returns
The basic premise of our study is that it is not whether a ®rm belongs to a high-technology or low-technology industry but whether the ®rm has growth potential which determines the market's reaction to capital expenditure decisions. To examine this issue more directly, we run the following regression model for the group of ®rms in high-technology industries as well as for the group of ®rms in low-technology industries.
where SR i0 is the standardized abnormal return of stock i on the announcement date, D LD a dummy variable representing the announcement by low-q ®rms of decreases in capital expenditures, D HI a dummy variable representing the announcement by high-q ®rms of increases in capital expenditures, D HD a dummy variable representing the announcement by high-q ®rms of decreases in capital expenditures, and i is an error term. Notice that the intercept term (b 0 ) captures the market's reaction to the announcement by low-q ®rms of increases in capital expenditures. The above regression equation is estimated using both the market model abnormal returns and mean-adjusted abnormal returns. According to our hypotheses, we expect that b 0`0 , b 1 > 0, b 2 > 0, and b 3`0 regardless of whether the above regression model is estimated using the sample of ®rms in high-technology industries or the sample of ®rms in low-technology industries. On the contrary, if a ®rm's industry aliation (i.e. high-vs. low-technology industries or industrial vs. utility industries) has, as previous studies have implicated, important bearings on market reactions to capital expenditure decisions, we would expect otherwise. For example, if the announcements by high-technology ®rms of increases in capital expenditures are favorably received by the market, while the same announcements by low-technology ®rms are negatively received, one would expect the expected sign of b 2 to be positive for high-technology ®rms, but negative for low-technology ®rms. Table 4 presents the regression results. Notice that the market reacts favorably to the announcements of increases in capital expenditures for the group of high-q ®rms, regardless of their industry aliations. Similarly, the market reacts favorably to the announcements of decreases in capital expenditures for the group of low-q ®rms in both high-and low-technology industries. Moreover, we ®nd that announcements by high-technology ®rms of increases in capital expenditures exert a negative impact on share prices when the market's perceived quality of those ®rms' investment opportunities is poor. Similarly, empirical evidence reveals that announcements of decreases in capital spending by low-technology ®rms exert a negative, not positive, impact on share prices when they have high q ratios.
10 On the whole, these results strongly support our proposition that it is a ®rm's growth potential rather than its industry af®liation which will dictate the market's reaction to its investment decision. Our results, however, show that the market reaction to announcements of increases in capital spending by low-q ®rms in low-technology industries is not statistically signi®cant. One possible interpretation of this result is that capital spending decisions of low-q ®rms in low-technology industries may rarely have important strategic value. For these ®rms, there would be no compelling reason to keep capital spending plans private until the last minute. Therefore, the information may be shared with outsiders well before its ocial announcement. As a result, capital spending decisions by these ®rms may not come as a surprise when they are announced, and thus excess returns would not accrue in response to the announcements.
11
Our empirical results also suggest that the market's response to corporate announcements is asymmetric between good and bad decisions. That is, the market tends to respond strongly to good decisions (e.g. increased capital spending by high-q ®rms or decreased capital spending by low-q ®rms), but the market's reaction tends to be less prominent for bad decisions (e.g. decreased capital spending by high-q ®rms or increased capital spending by low-q ®rms). In fact, Table 4 shows that the majority of coecient estimates with negative expected sign are not statistically signi®cant. This is a puzzling result because there is no reason to believe that the market's ability to recognize value-increasing decisions should dier from it's ability to recognize value-decreasing decisions.
Conclusion
In this study, we examine the impact of corporate capital expenditure decisions on share prices. Although previous studies suggest that the market tends to react more favorably to the capital spending decisions of high-technology ®rms, their categorization of ®rms lacks sound economic reasoning. We argue that share price reaction to a ®rm's capital expenditure announcements depends more on the market's assessment of the quality of its investment opportunities than its industry aliation.
Empirical evidence is generally consistent with our conjectures. We ®nd that: (1) announcements of increases (decreases) in capital spending result in positive share price changes among ®rms with q ratios of greater (less) than unity, regardless of their industry aliations, (2) announcements by high-technology ®rms of increases in capital expenditures result in negative share price changes when the market's perceived quality of their investment opportunities is poor, and (3) announcements by low-technology ®rms of decreases in capital spending exert a negative impact on share prices when they are high-q ®rms. These results are supportive of our belief that it is a ®rm's growth prospects rather than its industry aliation which determine the market's reaction to capital expenditure decisions.
11 For high-q ®rms, however, capital expenditure decisions may have signi®cant strategic value. Hence, capital investment plans of these ®rms may not be shared with outsiders prior to the announcement (although there may be some involuntary leakage just prior to the announcement). This would give such ®rms lead time over rivals which may be predisposed to imitate their innovations. In such cases, because they are surprises, announcements of increases in capital expenditures may result in excess returns accruing to shareholders. Our empirical results are consistent with this view.
The results of this study are signi®cant because they oer evidence that the q ratio indeed measures the marginal pro®tability of the ®rm's investment opportunities (or at least the market's perception of it). So far, macroeconomists and ®nancial theorists have not uniformly agreed that q is a reasonable measure of the ®rm's investment opportunity set. In our study, we take a robust measure of the ®rm's investment policy on the margin (i.e. the announced changes in capital expenditures) and we ®nd that the market updates its expectations about the ®rm's future pro®tability. This updating is consistent with the view of q as a measure of pro®tability of the ®rm's marginal investment opportunities.
A.1.3. Market value of short-term liabilities and long-term debt
We use the book value of current liabilities (#5) as an estimate of their market value. The market value of long-term debt is calculated using the Lindenberg and Ross procedure.
The book value of long term debt (#9) can be decomposed into two components: debt with known maturity and debt with unknown maturity. The known maturity portion consists of bonds maturing in year 2 through year 5 (#91± #94) and bonds issued in the current year (which is assumed to mature in 20 years).
The unknown maturity portion of debt is equal to the dierence between the total long term debt and the known maturity debt [i.e. #9 A (#91 + Á Á Á + #94 + #111)]. We assume that the unknown maturity debt is distributed evenly over the years for which the maturity information is not available (i.e. year 6 to year 19 relative to the current year).
We assume that debt maturing in year t has been issued in year t A 20 with a coupon rate equal to the average yield for BAA bonds obtained from Moody's Investors Service.
Then we discount these payments with the bond yield from the current year to obtain the estimate of the market value of debt for that year.
A.2. Replacement cost of assets
Assets of a ®rm can be categorized into four groups: quick assets (i.e. current assets, excluding inventory), inventory, plant and equipment, and investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries, intangibles and other investments. The replacement costs of these assets are calculated using the following procedures.
A.2.1. Quick assets
The book value of quick assets (#4±#3) is used as the proxy for their replacement costs.
A.2.2. Inventory
If the ®rm uses the FIFO method of accounting, the replacement cost of inventory (RVINV) equals its book value (#3). If the ®rm uses LIFO, the following adjustment is made. In the base year, t, RVINV t is set equal to the book value (#3). RVINV in the following year is calculated by adjusting for the ination and the change in the inventory. For example, RVINV t1 equals RVINV t´( 1 + I t1 ) + (#3 t1 A #3 t ), where I t1 is the rate of in¯ation and #3 is the book value of inventory in each year. If the ®rm uses more than one method of inventory valuation, the book values are combined with the adjusted values using weights derived from the ranking of methods reported in Compustat (#59). The following weights are from McConnell and Servaes (1990) .
A.2.3. Plant and equipment
The average age (AA) of plant and equipment is assumed to equal the ratio of accumulated depreciation to depreciation for the year (i.e. AA (#7±#8)/ #14). Then the replacement cost (RVPE) is equal to the net value of plant and equipment multiplied by the current GNP de¯ator and divided by the GNP de¯ator AA years ago (i.e. RVPE #8´(GNP t /GNP tÀAA ), where GNP t is the GNP de¯ator for ®xed non-residential investment in the current year t).
A.2.4. Investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries, intangibles and other investments
The same approach in A.2.2 for the LIFO inventory is used to estimate the replacement value of investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries, intangibles and other investments (#31±#33). Finally, the replacement cost of assets equals the sum of those values determined in Sections A.2.1±A.2.4.
